THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

by Demosthenes

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Notes and Introduction by Thomas Leland, D.D.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

To the Fourth Philippic

SOON after the preceding oration (The Third Philippic) the Athenian succors arrived at Euboea. Demosthenes had proposed the decree for them; and the command was given to Phocion, whom the Athenians gladly employed on all extraordinary emergencies, and who was always ready to serve them, at the same time that he highly condemned their conduct.

Demosthenes attended Phocion, not in a military character, but to endeavor to gain over the people of Euboea to the Athenian interest; in which he had some success; while the general, on his part, acted with so much conduct and resolution, that the Macedonians were forced to abandon the island; and the Euboeans entered into a treaty of alliance with Athens.

In the mean time Philip marched along the Hellespont, to support his fleet then in view, and to prevent Diopithes from cutting off his provisions. When he had crossed the isthmus of the Chersonesus he returned, and by a forced march arrived with the choice of his army at Cardia, where he surprised Diopithes, and defeated him in an action in which that general fell. This he affected to consider, not as an open breach of his treaty, but only as the consequence of the protection he had granted to the Cardians, and an act of particular revenge he had determined to take on Diopithes.

Philip then joined his army, and encamped before Perinthus, a place considerable by its commerce and situation, ever firm to the Athenians, and consequently dreadful and dangerous to Philip. The Perinthians defended themselves with a courage almost incredible, and which, it appeared, could not be abated by danger or fatigue. Philip, on his part, pressed them by all the methods of assault; and, after many vigorous efforts on each side, when the city was just on the point of being taken by assault, or of being obliged to surrender at discretion, fortune provided for it an unexpected succor.

The fame of Philip's army having alarmed the court of Persia, Ochus sent his letters mandatory to the governors of the maritime provinces, directing them to supply Perinthus with all things in their power: in consequence of which they filled it with troops and provisions. While the Byzantines, justly conceiving their own turn would be next, sent into the city the flower of their youth, with all other necessaries for an obstinate defence.

The Perinthians, thus reinforced, resumed their former ardor; and as all they suffered was on account of Athens, they despatched ambassadors thither to demand the speedy and effectual assistance of

that state. On this occasion Demosthenes pronounced the following oration.

FOURTH_PHILIPPIC

THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

Pronounced in the Archonship of Nicomachus, the year after the former oration (The Third Philippic) *(1)

AS I am persuaded, Athenians, that you are now convened about affairs of greatest moment, such as affect the very being of the state, I shall endeavor to speak to them in the manner most agreeable to your interests.

There are faults of no late origin, and gradually increased to no inconsiderable number, which have conspired to involve us in the present difficulties. But, of all these, what at this time most distresses us is this: that your minds are quite alienated from public affairs; that your attention is engaged just while you are assembled, and some new event related: then each man departs; and, far from being influenced by what he hath heard, he does not even remember it.

The insolence and outrage with which Philip treats all mankind are really so great as you hear them represented. That it is not possible to set bounds to these by the force of speeches and debates no one can be ignorant; for, if other arguments cannot convince, let this be weighed: whenever we have had occasion to plead in defence of our rights, we have never failed of success; we have never incurred the censure of injustice: but all places and all persons must acknowledge that our arguments are irresistible. Is he then distressed by this? and are our affairs advanced? By no means. For, as he proceeds to take up arms, leads out his troops, and is ready to hazard his whole empire in pursuit of his designs, while we sit here pleading, or attending to those who plead the justness of our cause, the consequence (and I think the natural consequence) is this: actions prove superior to words: and men's regards are engaged, not by those arguments which we ever have advanced, or may now advance, how just soever; but by the measures we pursue: and these are by no means fitted to protect any of the injured states: to say more of them is unnecessary.

As then, all Greece is now divided into two parties; the one composed of those who desire neither to exercise nor to be subject to arbitrary power, but to enjoy the benefits of liberty, laws, and independence; the other, of those who, while they aim at an absolute command of their fellow-citizens, are themselves the vassals of another person, by whose means they hope to obtain their purposes; his partisans, the affecters of tyranny and despotism, are superior everywhere. So that, of all the popular constitutions, I know not whether one be left firmly established except our own. And they who in the several states have been raised by him to the administration of affairs have their superiority secured by all the means which can advance a cause. The first and principal is this. When they would bribe those who are capable of selling their integrity, they have a

person ever ready to supply them. In the next place (and it is of no less moment), at whatever season they desire it, there are forces at hand to overwhelm their opposers: while we, Athenians, are not only deficient in these particulars, but unable even to awaken from our indolence, like men reduced by some potion *(2) to a lethargic state. In consequence of this (for I hold it necessary to speak the truth), we are fallen into such contempt and infamy, that, of the people immediately threatened with danger, some contend with us for the honor of commanding, some about the place of conference, *(3) while others determine rather to trust to their own strength than to accept of your assistance.

And why am I thus particular in recounting these things? I call the gods to witness, that I would not willingly incur your displeasure; but I would have you know, and see, that in public as well as in private affairs, continued indolence and supineness, though not immediately felt in every single instance of omission, yet in the end must affect the general welfare. You see this in the instance of Serium and Doriscum. When the peace was made we began with neglecting these places. (Perhaps some of you have never heard of them.) And these places, thus abandoned and despised, lost you Thrace and your ally Cersobleptes. Again, when he saw that this did not rouse you, and that you sent no assistance, he razed Porthmus; and, to keep us in continual awe, erected a tyranny in Euboea, over against Attica. This was disregarded; and his attempt on Megara was well-nigh successful. Still you were insensible, expressed no impatience, no inclination to oppose him. He purchased Antronae; and soon after got possession of Oreum. I pass over many things; Pherae- the march to Ambracia- the massacre of Elis, *(4) and thousands of the like actions: for it is not my design to give a detail of Philip's acts of outrage and injustice, but to convince you that the property and liberty of mankind will never be secure from him until he meets with some effectual opposition.

There are persons who, before they hear affairs debated, stop us with this question, "What is to be done?" not that they may do it when informed (for then they would be the best of citizens), but to prevent the trouble of attending. It is my part, however, to declare what we are now to do.

First, then, Athenians, be firmly persuaded of this: that Philip is committing hostilities against us, and has really violated the peace: that he has the most implacable enmity to this whole city; to the ground on which this city stands; to the very gods of this city: (may their vengeance fall on him!) but against our constitution is his force principally directed: the destruction of this is, of all other things, the most immediate object of his secret schemes and machinations. And there is, in some sort, a necessity that it should be so. Consider; he aims at universal power; and you he regards as the only persons to dispute his pretensions. He hath long injured you: and of this he himself is fully conscious; for the surest barriers of his other dominions are those places which he hath taken from us: so

that if he should give up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would not think himself secure in Macedon. He is then sensible that he entertains designs against you, and that you perceive them; and as he thinks highly of your wisdom, he judges that you hold him in the abhorrence he deserves. To these things (and these of such importance) add, that he is perfectly convinced that although he were master of all other places, yet it is impossible for him to be secure while your popular government subsists: but that, if any accident should happen to him (and every man is subject to many), all those who now submit to force would seize the opportunity, and fly to you for protection; for you are not naturally disposed to grasp at power, or to usurp dominion; but to prevent usurpation, to wrest their unjust acquisitions from the hands of others, to curb the violence of ambition, and to preserve the liberty of mankind, is your peculiar excellence. And, therefore, it is with regret he sees in that freedom you enjoy a spy on the incidents of his fortune: nor is this his reasoning weak or trivial. First, then, he is on this account to be regarded as the implacable enemy of our free and popular constitution. In the next place, we should be fully persuaded that all those things which now employ him, all that he is now projecting, he is projecting against this city. There can be none among you weak enough to imagine that the desires of Philip are centred in those paltry villages of Thrace; (for what name else can we give to Drongilus, and Cabyle, and Mastira, and all those places now said to be in his possession?) that he endures the severity of toils and seasons, and exposes himself to the utmost dangers for these; and has no designs on the ports, and the arsenals, and the navies, and the silver mines, and other revenues, and the situation, and the glory of Athens (which never may the conquest of this city give to him or any other!) but will suffer us to enjoy these; while, for those trifling hoards of grain he finds in the cells of Thrace he takes up his winter-quarters in all the horrors of a dungeon. It cannot be! Even in his march thither he had these in view: these are the chief objects of all his enterprises.

Thus must we all think of him. And let us not oblige that man who hath ever been our most faithful counsellor to propose the war in form: that would be to seek a pretence to avoid it, not to pursue the interest of our country. To yourselves I appeal: if, after the first, or the second, or the third of Philip's infractions of his treaty (for there was a long succession of them), any man had moved you to declare hostilities against him, and he had given the same assistance to the Cardians as now, when no such motion came from any Athenian, would not that man have been torn to pieces? Would you not have cried out with one voice that it was this which made him ally to the Cardians? Do not then seek for some person whom you may hate for Philip's faults, whom you may expose to the fury of his hirelings. When your decree for war hath once passed, let there be no dispute whether it ought or ought not to have been undertaken. Observe his manner of attacking you: imitate it in your opposition: supply those

who are now opposing him with money, and whatever else they want: raise your supplies: prepare your forces, galleys, horse, transports, and all other necessaries of a war. At present, your conduct must expose you to derision. Nay, I call the powers to witness, that you are acting as if Philip's wishes were to direct you. Opportunities escape you; your treasures are wasted; you shift the weight of public business on others; break into passion; criminate each other. I shall now show whence these disorders have proceeded, and point out the remedy.

You have never, Athenians, made the necessary dispositions in your affairs, nor armed yourselves in time; but have been ever led by events. Then, when it proves too late to act, you lay down your arms. If another incident alarms you, your preparations are resumed, and all is tumult and confusion. But this is not the way. It is impossible ever to secure the least success by occasional detachments. No: you must raise a regular army, provide for its subsistence, appoint state treasurers, and guard the public money with the strictest attention; oblige those treasurers to answer for the sums expended, and your general for his conduct in the field; and let this general have no pretence to sail to any other place, or engage in any other enterprise but those prescribed. Let these be your measures, these your resolutions, and you will compel Philip to live in the real observance of an equitable peace, and to confine himself to his own territory; or you will engage him on equal terms. And perhaps, Athenians, perhaps, as you now ask, "What is Philip doing? whither is he marching?" so there may come a time when he will be solicitous to know whither our forces have directed their march, and where they are to appear.

If it be objected that these measures will be attended with great expense, and many toils and perplexities, I confess it. (It is necessary, absolutely necessary that a war should be attended with many disagreeable circumstances.) But let us consider what consequences must attend the state if we refuse to take this course, and it will appear that we shall really be gainers by a seasonable performance of our duty. Suppose some god should be our surety (for no mortal could be depended on in an affair of such moment); for, although you are quite inactive and insensible, yet he will not at last lead his armies hither; still it would be ignominious, it would (I call every power of heaven to witness!) be beneath you, beneath the dignity of your state, beneath the glory of your ancestors, to abandon all the rest of Greece to slavery for the sake of private ease. I for my part would rather die than propose such a conduct: if, however, there be any other person to recommend it to you, be it so; make no opposition; abandon all affairs; but if there be no one of this opinion; if, on the contrary, we all foresee that the farther this man is suffered to extend his conquests the more dangerous and powerful enemy we must find in him, why is our duty evaded? why do we delay? or when will we be disposed to exert ourselves, Athenians? Must some necessity press us? What one may call the necessity of freemen not

only presseth us now, but hath long since been felt; that of slaves, it is to be wished, may never approach us. How do these differ? To freemen, the most urgent necessity is dishonor; a greater cannot, I think, be assigned; to slaves, stripes and tortures. Far be this from us? It ought not to be mentioned!

And now the neglect of those things to which your lives and fortunes should be devoted, it must be confessed, is by no means justifiable: far from it! some pretence, however, may be alleged in its excuse. But to refuse even to listen to those things which demand your utmost attention, which are of the greatest moment to be fully considered, this deserves the most severe censure. And yet you never attend but on occasions like this, when the danger is actually present; nor in time of disengagement do you ever think of consulting; but, while he is preparing to distress you, instead of making like preparations and providing for your defence, you are sunk in inactivity; and if anyone attempts to rouse you, he feels your resentment. But when advice is received that some place is lost or invested, then you attend, then you prepare. The proper season for attending and consulting was then, when you refused: now, when you are prevailed on to hear, you should be acting, and applying your preparations. And by this supineness is your conduct distinguished from that of all other nations: they usually deliberate before events; your consultations follow them. There is but one course left, which should long since have been pursued, but still may be of service. This I shall lay before you.

There is nothing which the state is more concerned to procure on this occasion than money; and some very favorable opportunities present themselves, which, if wisely improved, may possibly supply our demands. In the first place, they whom the king regards *(5) as his faithful and strenuous adherents are the implacable enemies of Philip, and actually in arms against him. Then, the man who was *(6) Philip's assistant and counsellor in all his designs against the king hath been lately seized; so that the king will be informed of his practices, not by our accusations, to which he might suppose our private interest prompted us, but by the very agent and conductor of them. This will give weight to your assertions; and there will be nothing left for your ministers to urge but what the king will gladly attend to: "That we should unite to chastise the man who hath injured us equally: that Philip will be much more formidable to the king if his first attack be made on us; for that, if he should be permitted to gain any advantage here, he will then march against him, free from all apprehensions." For all these reasons, I think you should send ambassadors to treat with the king, and lay aside those idle prejudices which have so often been injurious to your interest- "that he is a barbarian, our common enemy," and the like. For my own part, when I find a man apprehending danger from a prince whose residence is in Susa and Ecbatana, and pronouncing him the enemy of our state, who formerly re-established its power, *(7) and but now made us *(8) such considerable offers (if you rejected them,

that was no fault of his), and yet speaking in another strain of one who is at our gates, who is extending his conquests in the very heart of Greece, the plunderer of the Greeks, I am astonished; and regard that man, whoever he is, as dangerous, who doth not see danger in Philip.

There is another affair wherein the public hath been injured, which hath been attacked most unjustly and indecently; which is the constant pretence of those who refuse to perform their duty to the state; to which you will find the blame of every omission which every man is guilty of constantly transferred. I cannot speak of it without great apprehensions. Yet I will speak: for I think I can serve my country by advancing some things, both in behalf of the poor *(9) against the rich, and of the rich against the necessitous; if we first banish those invectives unjustly thrown out against the theatrical funds, and those fears that such an appointment cannot subsist without some dismal consequences; an appointment which, above all others, may be most conducive to our interests, and give the greatest strength to the whole community.

Attend, then, while I first plead for those who are thought necessitous. There was a time, not long since, when the state could not raise more than one hundred and thirty talents; *(10) and yet none of those who were to command or to contribute to the equipment of a galley ever had recourse to the pretence of poverty to be exempted from their duty; but vessels were sent out, money was supplied, and none of our affairs neglected. After this (thanks to fortune!) our revenues were considerably improved; and, instead of one hundred, rose to four hundred talents; and this without any loss to the wealthy citizens, but rather with advantage; for they share the public affluence, and justly share it. Why, then, do we reproach each other? why have we recourse to such pretences to be exempted from our duty? unless we envy the poor that supply with which fortune hath favored them. I do not, and I think no one should, blame them; for in private families I do not find the young so devoid of respect to years, or indeed anyone so unreasonable and absurd as to refuse to do his duty unless all others do quite as much: such perverseness would render a man obnoxious to the laws against undutiful children; for to nothing are we more inviolably bound than to a just and cheerful discharge of that debt in which both nature and the laws engage us to our parents. And as we each of us have our particular parents, so all our citizens are to be esteemed the common parents of the state; and therefore, instead of depriving them of what the state bestows, we ought, if there were not this provision, to find out some other means of supplying their necessities. If the rich proceed on these principles, they will act agreeably not to justice only, but to good policy; for to rob some men of their necessary subsistence is to raise a number of enemies to the commonwealth.

To men of lower fortunes I give this advice: that they should remove those grievances of which the wealthier members complain so loudly and so justly (for I now proceed in the manner I proposed, and shall not

scruple to offer such truths as may be favorable to the rich). Look out, not through Athens only, but every other state, and, in my opinion, you will not find a man of so cruel, so inhuman a disposition, as to complain when he sees poor men, men who even want the necessaries of life, receiving these appointments. Where then lies the difficulty? Whence this animosity? When they behold certain persons charging private fortunes with those demands which were usually answered by the public; when they behold the proposer of this immediately rising in your esteem, and, as far as your protection can make him, immortal; when they find your private votes entirely different from your public clamors; then it is that their indignation is raised; for justice requires, Athenians, that the advantages of society should be shared by all its members. The rich should have their lives and fortunes well secured; that so, when any danger threatens their country, their opulence may be applied to its defence. Other citizens should regard the public treasure as it really is, the property of all, and be content with their just portion; but should esteem all private fortunes as the inviolable right of their possessors. Thus a small state rises to greatness; a great one preserves its power.

But it may be said that possibly these are the duties of our several citizens: yet, that they may be performed agreeably to the laws, some regulations must first be made. The causes of our present disorders are many in number, and of long continuance. Grant me your attention, and I shall trace them to their origin.

You have departed, Athenians, from that plan of government which your ancestors laid down. You are persuaded by your leaders, that to be the first among the Greeks, to keep up your forces ready to redress the injured, is an unnecessary and vain expense. You are taught to think, that to lie down in indolence, to be free from public cares, to abandon all your interests one by one, a prey to the vigilance and craft of others, is to be perfectly secure, and surprisingly happy. By these means the station which you should have maintained is now seized by another, and he is become the successful, the mighty potentate. And what else could have been expected? for as the Lacedaemonians were unfortunate, the Thebans engaged in the Phocian War, and we quite insensible, he had no competitor for a prize so noble, so great, so illustrious, which for a long time engaged the most considerable states of Greece in the severest contests. Thus is he become formidable, strengthened by alliances and attended by his armies; while all the Greeks are involved in so many and so great difficulties, that it is hard to say where they may find resources. But of all the dangers of the several states, none are so dreadful as those which threaten ours; not only because Philip's designs aim principally at us, but because we, of all others, have been most regardless of our interests.

If, then, from the variety of merchandise and plenty of provisions, you flatter yourselves that the state is not in danger, you judge unworthily and falsely. Hence we might determine whether our

markets were well or ill supplied: but the strength of that state which is regarded by all who aim at the sovereignty of Greece as the sole obstacle to their designs, the well-known guardian of liberty, is not surely to be judged of by its vendibles. No: we should inquire whether it be secure of the affections of its allies; whether it be powerful in arms. These are the points to be considered; and in these, instead of being well provided, you are totally deficient. To be assured of this you need but attend to the following consideration. At what time have the affairs of Greece been in the greatest confusion? I believe it will not be affirmed that they have ever been in greater than at present: for in former times Greece was always divided into two parties, that of the Lacedaemonians and ours. All the several states adhered to one or the other of these. The king, while he had no alliances here, was equally suspected by all. By espousing the cause of the vanquished *(11) he gained some credit, until he restored them to the same degree of power with their adversaries; after that, he became no less hated *(12) by those whom he had saved than by those whom he had constantly opposed. But now, in the first place, the king lives in amity with all the Greeks (indeed, without some immediate reformation in our conduct, we must be excepted). In the next place, there are several cities which affect the characters of guardians and protectors. They are all possessed with a strong passion for pre-eminence; and some of them (to their shame!) desert, and envy, and distrust each other. In a word, the Argians, Thebans, Corinthians, Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Athenians have all erected themselves into so many distinct sovereignties. But among all these parties, all these governing states, into which Greece is broken, there is not one (if I may speak freely) to whose councils *(13) fewer Grecian affairs are submitted than to ours; and no wonder, when neither love, nor confidence, nor fear can induce any people to apply to you. It is not one single cause that hath effected this (in that case the remedy were easy), but many faults, of various natures and of long continuance. Without entering into a particular detail, I shall mention one in which they all centre; but I must first entreat you not to be offended if I speak some bold truths without reserve.

Every opportunity which might have been improved to your advantage hath been sold. The ease and supineness in which you are indulged have disarmed your resentment against the traitors; and thus others are suffered to possess your honors. But at present I shall take notice only of what relates to Philip. If he be mentioned, immediately there is one ready to start up and cry, "We should not act inconsiderately: we should not involve ourselves in a war." And then he is sure not to forget the great happiness of living in peace, the misfortune of being loaded with the maintenance of a large army, the evil designs of some persons against our treasures; with others of the like momentous truths.

But these exhortations to peace should not be addressed to you; your conduct is but too pacific: let them rather be addressed to him who is in arms. If he can be prevailed on, there will be no difficulty on

your part. Then, it cannot be thought a misfortune to provide for our security at the expense of some part of our possessions: the consequences that must arise, if this provision be neglected, rather deserve that name. And as to the plundering of your treasury, this must be prevented by finding some effectual means to guard it; not by neglecting your interests. Nor can I but express the utmost indignation, when I find some of you complaining that your treasures are plundered, though it be in your power to secure them, and to punish the guilty; and yet looking on with indifference, while Philip is plundering every part of Greece successively; and this, that he may at last destroy you.

And what can be the reason, Athenians, that when Philip is guilty of such manifest violations of justice, when he is actually seizing our cities, yet none of these men will acknowledge that he acts unjustly, or commits hostilities; but assert that they who rouse you from your insensibility, and urge you to oppose these outrages, are involving you in war? This is the reason; that whatever accidents may happen in the course of the war (and there is a necessity, a melancholy necessity that war should be attended with many accidents), they may lay the whole blame on your best and most faithful counsellors. They know, that if with a steady and unanimous resolution you oppose the insolent invader, he must be conquered, and they deprived of a master whose pay was ever ready. But if the first unhappy accident calls you off to private trials and prosecutions, they need but appear as accusers, and two great points are secured- your favor, and Philip's gold; while you discharge the vengeance due to their perfidy against your faithful speakers. These are their hopes; these the grounds of their complaints that certain persons are involving you in war. For my own part, this I know perfectly, that although it hath never been proposed by any Athenian to declare war, yet Philip hath seized many of our territories, and but just now sent succors to the Cardians. But if we will persuade ourselves that he is not committing hostilities, he would be the most senseless of mortals should he attempt to undeceive us: for, when they who have received the injury deny it, must the offender prove his guilt? But when he marches directly hither, what shall we then say? He will still deny that he is at war with us (as he did to the people of Oreum, until his forces were in the heart of their dominions; as he did to those of Pherae, until he was on the point of storming their walls; as he did to the Olynthians, until he appeared in their territories at the head of an army). Shall we then say that they who urge us to defend our country are involving us in a war? If so, we must be slaves. There is no medium. Nor is your danger the same with that of other states. Philip's design is not to enslave, but to extirpate Athens. He knows that a state like yours, accustomed to command, will not, or, if it were inclined, cannot submit to slavery: he knows, that if you have an opportunity you can give him more disturbance than any other people; and, therefore, if ever he conquers us, we may be sure of finding no degree of mercy.

Since, then, you are engaged in defence of all that is dear to you, apply to the great work with an attention equal to the importance of it: let the wretches who have openly sold themselves to this man be the objects of your abhorrence: let them meet with the utmost severity of public justice: for you will not, you cannot conquer your foreign enemies until you have punished those that lurk within your walls. No: they will ever prove so many obstacles to impede our progress, and to give our enemies the superiority.

And what can be the reason that he treats you with insolence (for I cannot call his present conduct by another name); that he utters menaces against you; while he, at least, condescends to dissemble with other people, and to gain their confidence by good offices? Thus, by heaping favors on the Thessalians, he led them insensibly into their present slavery. It is not possible to enumerate all the various artifices he practised against the wretched Olynthians (such, among others, was the putting them in possession of Potidaea). In his late transactions with the Thebans, he enticed them to his party by yielding Boeotia to them, and by freeing them from a tedious and distressing war. And thus, after receiving their several insidious favors, some of these people have suffered calamities but too well known to all; others must submit to whatever may befall them. What you yourselves have formerly lost I shall not mention; but, in the very treaty of peace, in how many instances have we been deceived? how have we been despoiled? Did we not give up Phocis and the straits? Did we not lose our Thracian dominions- Doriscum, Serrium, and even our ally Cersobleptes? Is he not in possession of Cardia? and doth he not avow his usurpation? Whence is it, then, that his behavior towards you is so different from that towards others? Because, of all the Grecian states, ours is the only one in which harangues in favor of enemies are pronounced with impunity; and the venal wretch may utter his falsehoods with security, even while you are losing your dominions. It was not safe to speak for Philip at Olynthus until the people had been gained by Potidaea. In Thessaly it was not safe to speak for Philip until that people had been gained by the expulsion of their tyrants, and by being reinstated in the council of Amphictyons. Nor could it have been safely attempted at Thebes until he had given them up Boeotia, and exterminated the Phocians. But at Athens without the least danger may Philip be defended, although he hath deprived us of Amphipolis and the territory of Cardia; although he threatens our city by his fortifications in Euboea; although he is now marching to Byzantium. Hence some of his advocates have arisen from penury to affluence; from obscurity and contempt to honor and eminence; while, on the other hand, you have sunk from glory to disgrace; from wealth to poverty: for the riches of a state I take to be the number, fidelity, and affection of its allies; in all which you are notoriously deficient. And by your total insensibility, while your affairs are thus falling into ruin, he is become successful, great, and formidable to all the Greeks, to all the barbarians; and you deserted and inconsiderable; sumptuous, indeed, in

your markets; but in everything relating to military power, ridiculous.

There are some orators, I find, who view your interests and their own in quite a different light. To you they urge the necessity of continuing quiet, whatever injuries you are exposed to; they themselves find this impossible, though no one offers them the last injury. To you I speak, Aristodemus! *(14) Suppose a person should, without severity, ask you this question: "How is it that you, who are sensible (for it is a well-known truth) that the life of private men is serene and easy, and free from danger- that of statesmen invidious and insecure, subject to daily contests and disquiets- should yet prefer the life encompassed with dangers to that of peace and disengagement?" What could you say? Suppose we admit the truth of the very best answer you could make, "that you were prompted by a desire of honor and renown"; is it possible that you, who engaged in such painful undertakings, who despised all toils and dangers for the sake of these, should advise the state to give them up for ease and indulgence? You cannot, surely, say that it was incumbent on you to maintain a degree of eminence in the city; and that the city was not concerned to maintain her eminence in Greece! Nor do I see how the public safety requires that we should confine ourselves to our own concerns; and yet, that an officious intrusion into those of others should be necessary for your safety. On the contrary, you are involving yourself in the greatest dangers by being unnecessarily assiduous; and the city by being quite inactive. "But then you have an illustrious reputation, derived from your family, which it would be shameful not to support; while, on the contrary, nothing has been transmitted from our fathers but obscurity and meanness." This is equally false. Your father was like you, and therefore base and infamous. To the honor of our ancestors let all Greece bear witness- twice rescued *(15) by their valor from the greatest dangers.

There are persons, then, who do not act with the same firmness and integrity in the conduct of their own affairs and those of the state. Is not this the case, when some of them, after escaping from prison, have raised themselves so high as to forget their former condition; and yet have reduced a state, whose preeminence in Greece was but now universally acknowledged, to the lowest degree of infamy and meanness? I could say more on these and other points; but I forbear: for it is not want of good counsel that now distresses, or ever hath distressed you. But when your true interests have been laid before you, and that you have been unanimous in your approbation, you can, with equal patience, attend to those who endeavor to discredit, to overthrow all that hath been advanced. Not that you are ignorant of their characters (for you can, at first glance, distinguish the hireling and agent of Philip from the true patriot); but that by impeaching your faithful friends, and by turning the whole affair into ridicule and invective, you may find a pretence for the entire neglect of your duty.

You have now heard truths of the highest moment urged with all

freedom, simplicity, and zeal. You have heard a speech, not filled with flattery, danger, and deceit, calculated to bring gold to the speaker, and to reduce the state into the power of its enemies. It remains, therefore, that the whole tenor of your conduct be reformed; if not, that utter desolation which will be found in your affairs must be imputed wholly to yourselves.

NOTES

NOTES

To the Fourth Philippic

*(1) We shall find in this oration many things which occur in those that are precedent; and as it is on the same subject, already exhausted by so many orations, it was in some sort necessary for the orator to make use of repetitions: and it should seem, that in such a case repetition is by no means a fault, particularly as we may consider this as a recapitulation of all the others; and may, in effect, call it the peroration of the Philippics; in which the orator resumes the arguments he had already made use of; but, in resuming them, gives them new force, as well by the manner in which they are disposed, as by the many additions with which they are heightened.

*(2) In the original, like men who had drunk of mandragora, an herb ranked by naturalists among those of the soporiferous kind. It seems to have been a proverbial phrase to signify indolent and negligent persons.

*(3) In all the confederate wars of the Greeks, that state which was acknowledged the most powerful had the honor of giving a commander-in-chief, and of appointing the place of general congress for concerting the operations. In the Persian War we find the Lacedaemonians and Athenians sometimes contending for these points; which in effect was a dispute which of these states was most respectable.

*(4) An orator does not always pique himself on an exact adherence to history; but sometimes disguises facts, or aggravates them, when it serves his purpose. One would imagine that Philip had committed some terrible outrages at Pherae; and yet he only restored the liberty of that city, by expelling its tyrants; and as to the massacre of Elis, it is not to be imputed immediately to Philip. He had, indeed, as chief of the allies in the Sacred War, and head of the Amphictyons, suggested the resolution of proscribing the Phocians and all the favorers of their impiety. Some of these, who had fled into Crete with their general Phalecus, joined with a body of men who had been banished from Elis, made an inroad into Peloponnesus, and attempted an attack on their countrymen, who, with the assistance of the Arcadians, obliged this rebellious army to surrender at discretion; and, in obedience to the decree of the Amphictyons, put it to the sword.

*(5) He probably means the Thebans, who had given Ochus powerful assistance in the siege of Pelusium; and who were now much provoked at Philip, on account of Echinus, which he had taken from them.

*(6) As Philip seems to have already projected an expedition into

Asia, he received with open arms all the malcontents of Persia, and held secret intelligence with the rebel satraps. Hermias, the tyrant of Artanea, a city of Mysia, was of this number, and had been in confidence with Philip. Mentor, the Rhodian, general of the Persian army, drew him into an interview by feigned promises, where he seized him, and sent him in chains to Ochus. Instead of anarpastos some copies have anaspastos, brought back: in which case it must be understood of Memnon or Artabazus, two rebellious satraps, who had taken refuge in Philip's court, but by the mediation of Mentor, were reconciled to the king of Persia.

*(7) That is, when Conon, by the assistance of Artaxerxes Mnemon, beat the Lacedaemonian fleet at Cnidos, and restored the liberty and splendor of his country.

*(8) Artaxerxes Ochus, in order to reduce Egypt, which had revolted from him, solicited succors from the principal cities of Greece. Argos and Thebes consented: but from Athens and Lacedaemon he could obtain only vain professions of friendship. He had, without doubt, offered large advantages to such people as would concur with him. Demosthenes here insinuates an accusation of the imprudence of Athens in rejecting these offers.

*(9) The theatrical distributions afforded a perpetual occasion of public contests between the several orders of the state. The poor were ever dissatisfied that the richer citizens shared the largesses, which they considered as their own peculiar right: and the rich beheld with impatience the dissipation of the public funds, which threw the whole weight of the supplies on them. But there was still a greater cause of complaint. The revenues of the state were not always sufficient to defray the immense expenses of feasts and entertainments; and in this case, some factious leader, who was willing to gain popularity, would propose to tax the rich; or, perhaps, by some infamous calumnies, would raise a prosecution, which would bring in a large pecuniary fine. The rich, it may be imagined, were alarmed at such proceedings: they inveighed loudly against the authors of them, and sometimes ventured to accuse them in form, and bring them to trial. When their baseness and evil designs were publicly exposed, the people were ashamed to avow their intentions of supporting such flagrant injustice. Their clamors were loud against the person accused: but, as in all judicial processes they gave their votes by ballot, they then had an opportunity of saving their friend. All that the orator here says in defence of the theatrical appointments is expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite to his usual openness and freedom, and which plainly betray a consciousness of his being inconsistent with his former sentiments. How far he may be excused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent prepossessions of the people, and giving up a favorite point, I cannot pretend to determine. But it is certainly not very honorable to Demosthenes to suppose (with Ulpian) that his former opposition was merely personal, and that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it.

*(10) We must understand this of those revenues raised out of Attica only; for the contributions of the allies, according to the taxation of Aristides, amounted to four hundred and sixty talents annually. And Pericles raised them yet higher. In order to know the real value of their revenues, we should consider the prices of things. In the time of Solon an ox was sold at Athens for five drachmae; as we learn from Plutarch, in the life of Solon. A hog, in the time of Aristophanes, was worth three drachmae; as appears from one of his comedies called "The Peace." A drachma, according to Arbuthnot, was equal to 7 3/4d. of our money. A hundred drachmae made a mina, or L3 4s. 7d. We may also, from the same author, add to the foregoing note these particulars. In the time of Solon corn was reckoned as a drachma the medimnus, or 4s. 6d. per quarter. In the time of Demosthenes it was much higher, at five drachmae the medimnus, which makes it L1 2s. 7 3/4d. per quarter. In Solon's time the price of a sheep was 7 3/4d. A soldier's daily pay was a drachma. The yearly salary of a common schoolmaster at Athens was a mina. In the early times of the republic, five hundred drachmae, L16 2s. 11d., were thought a competent fortune for a gentlewoman. To Aristides's two daughters the Athenians gave three thousand drachmae, L96 17S. 2d. The arts and sciences were rated very high; and though the price of a seat in the theatre was no more than two oboli, or 2 1/2d., yet the performers were rewarded magnificently. When Amoebaeus sang in the theatre of Athens his pay per diem was a talent.

*(11) Lacedaemon first entered into an alliance with Darius Nothus, by the mediation of Tissaphernes; which enabled Lysander to conquer Athens. Conon obtained from Artaxerxes Mnemon the succors necessary to revenge his country and to re-establish it. And it was with reason that the kings of Persia attended to the preservation of a due balance between the Grecian states, lest the prevailing power might turn its thoughts to Asia, and attempt an invasion there.

*(12) Lacedaemon had no sooner subjected the Athenians, by the help of Darius, but she ravaged the Persian provinces in Asia Minor, and joined with the rebellious satraps. And as soon as the Athenians were delivered by Artaxerxes from the Spartan yoke, they espoused the quarrel of Evagoras, who had revolted from Artaxerxes, and usurped a great part of the kingdom of Cyprus. Benefits could not bind these states. Interest alone formed their engagements, and interest dissolved them. The picture here exhibited of the conduct of the Greeks towards the kings of Persia is by no means flattering in point of morals. But it is not in ancient times only that we find morals must be silent when politics speak.

*(13) The ruling states of Greece accounted it their greatest glory to see and hear a number of ambassadors in their assemblies, soliciting their protection and alliance. The conquests which Philip made in Thrace had put an end to many applications of this sort, which had formerly been addressed to the Athenians; and their indolence made people decline any engagements with them. Foreigners were persuaded, that they who were insensible to their own interests were not likely

to grant the due attention to those of others.

*(14) He was by profession a player, and was one of the ten ambassadors which the Athenians had sent to the court of Macedon to treat about the peace. At his return Demosthenes proposed a decree for crowning this very man for his good services, whom he here inveighs against with so much bitterness.

*(15) First at Marathon, and afterward at Salamis. Isocrates mentions a third time, when they delivered Greece from the Spartan yoke. Demosthenes (frequently speaks of this in the highest terms, but) here rather chooses to lessen the glory of his country than to recall an event which reflected on the Lacedaemonians, now in alliance with Athens.

THE END OF THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC