

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

by Demosthenes

translated by Thomas Leland, D.D.

Notes and Introduction by Thomas Leland, D.D.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

To the First Philippic

WE know that Philip was opposed in his design of passing into Greece through Thermopylae, and obliged to retire. The danger they had thus escaped deeply affected the Athenians. So daring an attempt, which was in effect declaring his purposes, filled them with astonishment; and the view of a power which every day received new accessions drove them even to despair. Yet their aversion to public business was still predominant. They forgot that Philip might renew his attempt, and thought they had provided sufficiently for their security by posting a body of troops at the entrance of Attica, under the command of Menelaus, a foreigner. They then proceeded to convene an assembly of the people, in order to consider what measures were to be taken to check the progress of Philip; on which occasion Demosthenes, for the first time, appeared against that prince, and displayed those abilities which proved the greatest obstacle to his designs.

At Athens the whole power and management of affairs were placed in the people. It was their prerogative to receive appeals from the courts of justice, to abrogate and enact laws, to make what alterations in the state they judged convenient; in short, all matters, public or private, foreign or domestic, civil, military, or religious, were determined by them.

Whenever there was occasion to deliberate the people assembled early in the morning, sometimes in the forum or public place, sometimes in a place called Pnyx, but most frequently in the theatre of Bacchus. A few days before each assembly there was a programma or placard fixed on the statues of some illustrious men erected in the city, to give notice of the subject to be debated. As they refused admittance into the assembly to all persons who had not attained the necessary age, so they obliged all others to attend. The lexiarchs stretched out a cord dyed with scarlet, and by it pushed the people towards the place of meeting. Such as received the stain were fined; the more diligent had a small pecuniary reward. These lexiarchs were the keepers of the register in which were enrolled the names of such citizens as had a right of voting; and all had this right who were of age, and not excluded by a personal fault. Undutiful children, cowards, brutal debauchees, prodigals, debtors to the public, were all excluded. Until the time of Cecrops women had a right of suffrage, which they were said to have lost on account of their partiality to Minerva in her dispute with Neptune about giving a name to the city.

In ordinary cases all matters were first deliberated in the Senate of five hundred, composed of fifty senators chosen out of each of

the ten tribes. Each tribe had its turn of presiding, and the fifty senators in office were called prytanes; and, according to the number of the tribes, the Attic year was divided into ten parts, the first four containing thirty-six, the other thirty-five days, in order to make the lunar year complete, which, according to their calculation, contained three hundred and fifty-four days. During each of these divisions ten of the fifty prytanes governed for a week, and were called proedri; and of these he who in the course of the week presided for one day was called the epistate; three of the proedri being excluded from this office.

The prytanes assembled the people; the proedri declared the occasion, and the epistate demanded their voices. This was the case in the ordinary assemblies: the extraordinary were convened as well by the generals as the prytanes; and sometimes the people met of their own accord, without waiting the formalities.

The assembly was opened by a sacrifice, and the place was sprinkled with the blood of the victim. Then an imprecation was pronounced, conceived in these terms: "May the gods pursue that man to destruction with all his race, who shall act, speak, or contrive anything against this state!" This ceremony being finished, the proedri declared the occasion of the assembly, and reported the opinion of the Senate. If any doubt arose, a herald, by commission from the epistate, with a loud voice, invited any citizen, first of those above the age of fifty, to speak his opinion; and then the rest according to their ages. This right of precedence had been granted by a law of Solon, and the order of speaking determined entirely by the difference of years. In the time of Demosthenes this law was not in force. It is said to have been repealed about fifty years before the date of this oration. Yet the custom still continued out of respect to the reasonable and decent purpose for which the law was originally enacted. When a speaker had delivered his sentiments he generally called on an officer, appointed for that purpose, to read his motion, and propound it in form. He then sat down, or resumed his discourse, and enforced his motion by additional arguments: and sometimes the speech was introduced by his motion thus propounded. When all the speakers had ended the people gave their opinion, by stretching out their hands to him whose proposal pleased them most: and Xenophon reports, that, night having come on when the people were engaged in an important debate, they were obliged to defer their determination till next day, for fear of confusion when their hands were to be raised.

"Porrexerunt manus," saith Cicero (pro Flacco), "et psephisma natum est." And to constitute this psephisma or decree, six thousand citizens at least were required. When it was drawn up, the name of its author, or that person whose opinion had prevailed, was prefixed: whence, in speaking of it, they called it his decree. The date of it contained the name of the archon, that of the day and month, and that of the tribe then presiding. The business being over, the prytanes dismissed the assembly.

FIRST_PHILIPPIC

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

Pronounced in the Archonship of Aristodemus, in the first year
of the Hundred and Seventh Olympiad, and the ninth of
Philip's Reign

HAD we been convened, Athenians! on some new subject of debate, I had waited until most of the usual persons had declared their opinions. If I had approved of anything proposed by them, I should have continued silent: if not, I had then attempted to speak my sentiments. But since those very points on which these speakers have oftentimes been heard already, are at this time to be considered; though I have arisen first, *(1) I presume I may expect your pardon; for if they on former occasions had advised the necessary measures, ye would not have found it needful to consult at present.

First, then, Athenians! these our affairs must not be thought desperate; no, though their situation seems entirely deplorable. For the most shocking circumstance of all our past conduct is really the most favorable to our future expectations. And what is this? That our own total indolence hath been the cause of all our present difficulties. For were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honor of our state demanded, there were then no hope of a recovery.

In the next place, reflect (you who have been informed by others, and you who can yourselves remember) how great a power *(2) the Lacedaemonians not long since possessed; and with what resolution, with what dignity, you disdained to act unworthy of the state, but maintained the war against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention these things? That ye may know, that ye may see, Athenians! that if duly vigilant, ye cannot have anything to fear; that if once remiss, not anything can happen agreeable to your desires; witness the then powerful arms of Lacedaemon, which a just attention to your interests enabled you to vanquish: and this man's late insolent attempt, which our insensibility to all our great concerns hath made the cause of this confusion.

If there be a man in this assembly who thinks that we must find a formidable enemy in Philip, while he views, on one hand, the numerous armies *(3) which attend him; and, on the other, the weakness of the state thus despoiled of its dominions: he thinks justly. Yet, let him reflect on this: there was a time, Athenians! when we possessed Pydna, and Potidaea, and Methone, and all that country round: when many of those states, now subjected to him, were free and independent, and more inclined to our alliance than to his. Had then Philip reasoned in the same manner- "How shall I dare to attack the Athenians, whose garrisons command my territory, while I am destitute of all assistance!"- he would not have engaged in those enterprises which are now crowned with success; nor could he have raised himself to this pitch of greatness. No, Athenians! he knew this well, that all these places are but prizes, *(4) laid between the combatants, and ready for the conqueror: that the dominions of the

absent devolve naturally to those who are in the field; the possessions of the supine to the active and intrepid. Animated by these sentiments, he overturns whole countries; he holds all people in subjection: some, as by the right of conquest; others, under the title of allies and confederates: for all are willing to confederate with those whom they see prepared and resolved to exert themselves as they ought.

And if you, my countrymen! will now at length be persuaded to entertain the like sentiments: if each of you, renouncing all evasions, will be ready to approve himself a useful citizen, to the utmost that his station and abilities demand: if the rich will be ready to contribute, and the young to take the field: in one word, if you will be yourselves, and banish those vain hopes which every single person entertains- that while so many others are engaged in public business, his service will not be required; you then (if heaven so pleases) shall regain your dominions, recall those opportunities your supineness hath neglected, and chastise the insolence of this man. For you are not to imagine that, like a god, he is to enjoy his present greatness forever fixed and unchangeable. No, Athenians! there are who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among those seemingly the most attached to his cause. These are passions common to mankind; nor must we think that his friends only are exempted from them. It is true, they lie concealed at present, as our indolence deprives them of all resource. But let us shake off this indolence! for you see how we are situated; you see the outrageous arrogance of this man, who does not leave it to your choice whether you shall act, or remain quiet; but braves you with his menaces; and talks (as we are informed) *(5) in a strain of the highest extravagance: and is not able to rest satisfied with his present acquisitions, but is ever in pursuit of farther conquests; and while we sit down inactive and irresolute, encloses us on all sides with his toils.

When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigor? When roused by some event? When forced by some necessity? What then are we to think of our present condition? To freemen, the disgrace attending on misconduct is, in my opinion, the most urgent necessity. Or say, is it your sole ambition to wander through the public places, each inquiring of the other, "What new advices?" Can anything be more new than that a man of Macedon should conquer the Athenians, and give law to Greece?- "Is Philip dead?"- *(6) "No, but in great danger."- How are you concerned in those rumors? Suppose he should meet some fatal stroke: you would soon raise up another Philip, if your interests are thus regarded. For it is not to his own strength that he so much owes his elevation as to our supineness. And should some accident *(7) affect him, should Fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the state than we ourselves, now repeat her favors; (and may she thus crown them!)- be assured of this, that by being on the spot, ready to take advantage of the confusion, you will everywhere be absolute masters; but in your present disposition, even if a favorable juncture should present you with Amphipolis, *(8) you could not take

possession of it, while this suspense prevails in your designs and in your councils.

And now, as to the necessity of a general vigor and alacrity, of this you must be fully persuaded: this point therefore I shall urge no farther. But the nature of the armament, which, I think, will extricate you from the present difficulties, the numbers to be raised, the subsidies required for their support, and all the other necessities; how they may (in my opinion) be best and most expeditiously provided; these things I shall endeavor to explain.- But here I make this request, Athenians! that you would not precipitate, but suspend your judgment till you have heard me fully. And if, at first, I seem to propose a new kind of arrangement, let it not be thought that I am delaying your affairs. For it is not they who cry out, Instantly! This moment! whose counsels suit the present juncture (as it is not possible to repel violences already committed, by any occasional detachment), but he who will show you of what kind that armament must be, how great, and how supported, which may subsist until we yield to peace, or till our enemies sink beneath our arms; for thus only can we be secured from future dangers.- These things, I think, I can point out: not that I would prevent any other person from declaring his opinion.- Thus far am I engaged: how I can acquit myself will immediately appear: to your judgements I appeal.

First, then, Athenians! I say that you should fit out fifty ships of war: and then resolve that on the first emergency you will embark yourselves. To these I insist that you must add transport and other necessary vessels sufficient for half our horse. Thus far we should be provided against those sudden excursions from his own kingdom, to Thermopylae, to the Chersonesus, *(9) to Olynthus, *(10) to whatever places he thinks proper. For of this he should necessarily be persuaded that possibly you may break out from this immoderate indolence, and fly to some scene of action: as you did to Euboea, *(11) and formerly, as we are told, to Haliartus, *(12) and but now, to Thermopylae. But although we should not act with all this vigor (which yet I must regard as our indispensable duty), still the measures I propose will have their use; as his fears may keep him quiet, when he knows we are prepared (and this he will know, for there are too many *(13) among ourselves, who inform him of everything): or if he should despise our armament, his security may prove fatal to him; as it will be absolutely in our power, at the first favorable juncture, to make a descent upon his own coasts.

These, then, are the resolutions I propose- these the provisions it will become you to make. And I pronounce it still necessary to raise some other forces which may harass him with perpetual incursions. Talk not of your ten thousands, or twenty thousands, of foreigners; of those armies *(14) which appear so magnificent on paper; but let them be the natural forces of the state: and if you choose a single person, if a number, if this particular man, or whomever you appoint as general, let them be entirely under his

guidance and authority. I also move you, that subsistence be provided for them. But as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance of this body; how are these points to be settled?- I now proceed to speak of each of them distinctly.

The body of infantry, therefore- but here give me leave to warn you of an error, which hath often proved injurious to you. Think not that your preparations never can be too magnificent: great and terrible in your decrees; in execution, weak and contemptible. Let your preparations, let your supplies, at first be moderate; and add to these, if you find them not sufficient.- I say, then, that the whole body of infantry should be two thousand: of these, that five hundred should be Athenians, of such an age as you shall think proper, and with a stated time for service; not long, but such as that others may have their turn of duty. Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To those you are to add two hundred horse, fifty of them at least Athenians, to serve in the same manner as the foot. For these you are to provide transports.- And now, what farther preparations?- Ten light galleys. For, as he hath a naval power, *(15) we must be provided with light vessels, that our troops may have a secure convoy.

But whence are these forces to be subsisted? This I shall explain, when I have first given my reasons, why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have advised that we should serve in person. As to the numbers, Athenians! my reason is this: it is not at present in our power to provide a force able to meet him in the open field; but we must harass him by depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first. We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious army (for such we have neither pay nor provisions), nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have proposed that citizens should join in the service, and help to man our fleet; because I am informed that some time since the state maintained a body of auxiliaries at Corinth *(16) which Polystratus commanded, *(17) and Iphicrates, and Chabrias, and some others; that you yourselves served with them: and that the united efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces gained a considerable victory over the Lacedaemonians. But ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners alone, their victories have been over our allies and confederates; while our enemies have arisen to an extravagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail off to fight for Artabazus, *(18) or any other person; and their general follows them: nor should we wonder at it; for he cannot command, who cannot pay his soldiers. What then do I recommend? that you should take away all pretences both from generals and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army, and by incorporating domestic forces with the auxiliaries, to be as it were inspectors into the conduct of the commanders. For at present our manner of acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, "Are you at peace, Athenians!" the answer would immediately be, "By no means! we are at war with Philip. *(19) Have not we chosen the usual generals and officers, *(20) both of horse and foot?" And of what use are all

these, except the single person whom you send to the field? the rest attend your priests in their processions. So that, as if you formed so many men of clay, you make your officers for show, and not for service. My countrymen! should not all these generals have been chosen from your own body; all these several officers from your own body; that our force might be really Athenian? and yet, for an expedition in favor of Lemnos, *(21) the general must be a citizen, while troops engaged in defence of our own territories are commanded by Menelaus. *(22) I say not this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever this command had been entrusted, surely he should have derived it from your voices. *(23)

Perhaps you are fully *(24) sensible of these truths, but would rather hear me upon another point- that of the supplies; what we are to raise, and from what funds. To this I now proceed.- The sum therefore necessary for the maintenance of these forces, that the soldiers may be supplied with grain, is somewhat above ninety talents. *(25) To the ten galleys, forty talents, that each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty minae. To the two thousand foot, the same sum, that each soldier may receive ten drachmae a month for corn. To the two hundred horse, for a monthly allowance of thirty drachmae each, twelve talents. And let it not be thought a small convenience, that the soldiers are supplied with grain: for I am clearly satisfied that if such a provision be made, the war itself will supply them with everything else, so as to complete their appointment, and this without any injury to the Greeks or allies: and I myself am ready to sail with them, and to answer for the consequence with my life, should it prove otherwise. From what funds the sum which I propose may be supplied, shall now be explained.

[Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raising the supplies, and proposes it to the people in form, in the name of the orator.]

These are the supplies, *(26) Athenians! in our power to raise. And when you come to give your voices, determine upon some effectual provision, *(27) that you may oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by actions. And, in my opinion, your plan of operation, and everything relating to your armament, will be much more happily adjusted, if the situation of the country which is to be the scene of action be taken into account; and if you reflect that the winds and seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of Philip's conquests; that he watches the blowing of the Etesians, *(28) and the severity of the winter, and forms his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our forces. It is your part, then, to consider this, and not to carry on the war by occasional detachments (they will ever arrive too late), but by a regular army constantly kept up. And for winter quarters you may command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and the adjacent islands, in which there are ports and provisions, and all things necessary for the soldiery in abundance. As to the season of the year in which we may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in no danger from the winds, either upon the coast to which

we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbors where we may put in for provisions- this will be easily discovered. In what manner and at what time our forces are to act, their general will determine, according to the junctures of affairs. What you are to perform, on your part, is contained in the decree I have now proposed. And if you will be persuaded, Athenians! first, to raise these supplies which I have recommended, then, to proceed to your other preparations, your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly, to confine your forces, by a law, to that service which is appointed to them; reserving the care and distribution of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining into the conduct of the general; then, your time will be no longer wasted in continual debates upon the same subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then, you will deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues. For his arms are now supported by seizing and making prizes of those who pass the seas.- But is this all?- No.- You shall also be secure from his attempts: not as when some time since *(29) he fell on Lemnos and Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains: not as when he surprised your vessels at Gerastus, and spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches: not as when lately he made a descent on the coast of Marathon, and carried off our sacred galley: *(30) while you could neither oppose these insults nor detach your forces at such junctures as were thought convenient.

And now, Athenians! what is the reason (think ye) that the public festivals *(31) in honor of Minerva and of Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men of eminence, or of persons less distinguished (festivals which cost more treasure than is usually expended upon a whole navy; and more numbers and greater preparations than any one perhaps ever cost): while your expeditions have been all too late, as that to Methone, that to Pegasae, and to Potidaea? The reason is this: everything relating to the former is ascertained by law; and every one of you knows long before who is to conduct *(32) the several entertainments in each tribe; what he is to receive, when, and from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war, and warlike preparations, there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when any accident alarms us, first we appoint our trierarchs; *(33) then we allow them to exchange; then the supplies are considered. These points once settled, we resolve to man our fleet with strangers *(34) and foreigners; then find it necessary to supply their place ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are sailing to defend the enemy is already master of: for the time of action we spend in preparing: and the junctures of affairs will not wait our slow and irresolute measures. These forces, too, which we think may be depended on, until the new levies are raised, when put to the proof, plainly discover their insufficiency. By these means hath he arrived to such a pitch of insolence as to send a letter to the Euboeans, *(35) conceived in such terms as these.

[The letter is read.]

What hath now been read is for the most part true, Athenians! too true! but perhaps not very agreeable in the recital. But if, by suppressing things ungrateful to the ear, the things themselves could be prevented, then the sole concern of a public speaker should be to please. If, on the contrary, these unseasonably pleasing speeches be really injurious, it is shameful, Athenians! to deceive yourselves, and, by deferring the consideration of everything disagreeable, never once to move until it be too late; and not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with prudence, are not to follow, but to direct events; to direct them with the same absolute authority with which a general leads on his forces: that the course of affairs may be determined by them, and not determine their measures. But you, Athenians! although possessed of the greatest power *(36) of all kinds, ships, infantry, cavalry, and treasure; yet, to this day, have never employed any of them seasonably, but are ever last in the field. Just as barbarians *(37) engage at boxing, so you make war with Philip: for, when one of these receives a blow, that blow engages him; if struck in another part, to that part his hands are shifted: but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagonist- for this, he hath neither skill nor spirit. Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus, you resolve to send forces thither; if in Thermopylae, thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and down, you follow his standard. But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, no wise provisions, *(38) are ever thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in execution, or already crowned with success. This might formerly have been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be admitted.

It seems to me, Athenians! that some divinity, who, from a regard to Athens, look down upon our conduct with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this restless ambition. For, were he to sit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conquests and acquisitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you who, I think, would be unmoved at those transactions, *(39) which have branded our state with the odious marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But as he still pursues his conquests, as he is still extending his ambitious views, possibly he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athenians. To me it is astonishing that none of you look back to the beginning of this war, *(40) and consider that we engaged in it to chastise the insolence of Philip; but that now it is to become a defensive war, to secure us from his attempts. And that he will ever be repeating these attempts is manifest, unless some power rises to oppose him. But if we wait in expectation of this, if we send our armaments composed of empty galleys, and those hopes with which some speaker may have flattered you, can you then think your interests well secured? Shall we not embark? shall we not sail, with at least a part of our domestic force, now, since we have not hitherto? But where shall we make our descent?- Let us but engage in the enterprise, and the war itself,

Athenians! will show us where he is weakest. But if we sit at home, listening to the mutual invectives and accusations of our orators, we cannot expect, no, not the least success in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the whole be not present, the favor of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend to fight upon our side; but when we send out a general, and an insignificant decree, and the hopes of our speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, but strike our allies with deadly apprehensions. For it is not, it is not possible for any one man to perform everything you desire. He may promise, and harangue, and accuse this or that person: but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a general, who commanded a wretched collection of unpaid foreigners, hath been defeated; when there are persons here who, in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falsehoods, and when you lightly engage in any determination, just from their suggestions, what must be the consequence? How then shall these abuses be removed?- By offering yourselves, Athenians! to execute the commands of your general, to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return: so as not only to hear how your affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. But now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of our commanders is twice or thrice called before you, to answer for his life, though not one of them dared to hazard that life by once engaging his enemy. No; they choose the death of robbers and pilferers rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors should die by the sentence of the law. Generals should meet their fate bravely in the field.

Then, as to your own conduct- Some wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedaemonians, and they are concerting the destruction of Thebes, and the dissolution *(41) of some free states. Others assure us he hath sent an embassy to the king: *(42) others, that he is fortifying places in Illyria. *(43) Thus we all go about framing our several tales. I do believe indeed, Athenians! he is intoxicated with his greatness, and does entertain his imagination with many such visionary prospects, as he sees no power rising to oppose him, and is elated with his success. But I cannot be persuaded that he hath so taken his measures, that the weakest among us know what he is next to do (for it is the weakest among us who spread these rumors).- Let us disregard them: let us be persuaded of this, that he is our enemy, that he hath spoiled us of our dominions, that we have long been subject to his insolence, that whatever we expected to be done for us by others, hath proved against us, that all the resource left is in ourselves, that if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may be forced to engage here- let us be persuaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper determination, then shall we be freed from those idle tales. For we are not to be solicitous to know what particular events will happen; we need but be convinced nothing good can happen, unless you grant the due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes

Athenians.

I, on my part, have never upon any occasion chosen to court your favor by speaking anything but what I was convinced would serve you. And on this occasion I have freely declared my sentiments, without art, and without reserve. It would have pleased me indeed, that as it is for your advantage to have your true interest laid before you, so I might be assured that he who layeth it before you would share the advantage: for then I had spoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the consequence with respect to me, I yet determined to speak, because I was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must have their use. And, of all those opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be chosen which will best advance the general weal!

NOTES

NOTES

To the First Philippic

*(1) Demosthenes was at that time but thirty years old, which made it necessary for him to apologize for his zeal in rising before the other speakers: and the ingenious turn which he gives it not only prevents any unfavorable impression on the minds of his hearers, but engages their affection, and excites their attention, by the tacit promise of better counsel than they had hitherto received.

*(2) It has been already observed in the preface to these orations that Demosthenes takes many occasions of extolling the efforts of Athens to reduce the Spartan power, and to regain that sovereignty which they lost by the victory of Lysander at Aegos-Potamos. These efforts he everywhere represents as high instances of magnanimity and public spirit: though revenge and jealousy had no less share in them. The victories which the Athenians gained over Sparta at Corinth, Naxos, etc., and which he here alludes to, happened about twenty-four years before the date of this oration; so that he might well appeal to the memories of many persons present.

*(3) The number of Philip's forces at that time amounted to twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse; a great army compared with those of the Greeks. At their march to Marathon the Athenians could not assemble more than ten thousand troops.

*(4) His hearers were of all others most devoted to public games and entertainments, and must therefore have been particularly sensible of the beauty of this image.

*(5) The success which had hitherto attended Philip's arms must naturally have inspired him with those designs which he afterward executed against the Athenians; and resentment of their late opposition at Thermopylae might have made him less careful to conceal them, at least in his own court. This the orator represents as arrogant and extravagant menaces: not that a man who had so just a conception of the weakness of the Athenian politics, and the vigor and abilities of their enemy, could really believe such designs extravagant and romantic; but it was part of his address sometimes to avoid shocking the national vanity of his countrymen. After all

their losses, and amid all their indolence, they could not entertain a thought so mortifying, as that the conquerors of Persia and the arbiters of Greece could ever see their liberty essentially affected, or their power and glory entirely wrested from them by a king of Macedon.

*(6) These rumors and inquiries of the Athenians were occasioned by the wound Philip received at Methone, the year before, and which was followed by a dangerous fit of sickness. Longinus quotes this whole passage as a beautiful instance of those pathetic figures which give life and force and energy to an oration.

*(7) This is plainly the sense of it: but it must be expressed covertly, as Demosthenes has done, not to transgress against that decorum which, Cicero says, this orator made his first rule. For there were certain things which the ancients presumed not to express, but in terms obscure and gentle, that they might not pronounce what were called *verba male ominata*. They did not dare to say to any person, "If you should be killed; if you should die": they concealed as much as possible the melancholy and odious idea of an approaching, or even of a distant death. The Greeks said *ei ti pathois*; the Romans, *si quid humanitus contingat*.

*(8) They had nothing more at heart than the recovery of this city. So that the orator here gives the last and most heightening stroke to his description of their indolence. And at the same time, by artfully hinting at such an event as possible, he rouses their attention, and enlivens their hopes and expectations. The Italian commentator illustrates this passage in the following manner: "*Monet orator, quod quamvis accidat, ejusdem, compotes fieri, ipsis tamen non satis id fore ad turbandas res Macedonicas; cum aliis tot locis, quae memoravimus, privati, ad tantam rerum molem parum opis habere possint, ex una duntaxat civitate.*" Accordingly, the passage before us has been rendered to this effect: "If some favorable conjuncture should deliver up Amphipolis to you, etc., you could not receive the least benefit from the possession, with respect to Macedon." The assertion of the orator, as expressed in the present translation, has been pronounced extraordinary, and the argument inconclusive. The substance, therefore, of the present argument I shall here endeavor to collect: "You are all earnest to be informed whether Philip be dead or no. But, unless you change your measures, his death or life can make no difference, or prove of any consequence. Indeed, if some accident should take him off, nothing more would be necessary to give you the full advantage of the confusion which such an event must occasion than to appear on the frontier of Macedon with a powerful force. This would make you absolute masters of the country. But in your present circumstances, what would it avail, even if such a favorable incident as that of Philip's death should give you an opportunity of recovering Amphipolis? So important an acquisition (which would in a great measure enable you to command all Macedon) must still be lost; unless you had your forces ready, you could not take possession of it." Whether there be anything

unreasonable in this assertion, or impertinent in this argument, must be submitted to the reader. With deference to his judgment, I must declare that it appears to me to have rather more force, and to set the fatal consequence of the indolence and irresolution of the Athenians in a stronger light, than the other interpretation, whose propriety may be at once determined by comparing the passage with the sentence immediately preceding. In that the orator declares, that in case of Philip's death, the Athenians had no more to do but to appear on the frontier of Macedon, in order to gain the absolute disposal of the affairs of that kingdom: *Isth' oti plesion men ontes, apasin an tois pragmasi tetaragmenois epistantes, opos boulesthe dioikesaisthe*. We must therefore be at some pains to clear Demosthenes of the suspicion of inconsistency, if the very next sentence be understood as containing a declaration, That although the Athenians should not only appear on the borders of Macedon, but there possess themselves of a post of the utmost consequence, still they could derive no advantage from their acquisition- far from having the whole kingdom at their disposal. What seems to have tempted the Italian commentator to suggest this interpretation is the expression *didonton umin ton kairon Amphipolin-* if some conjunctures should give you Amphipolis; which he takes in a literal sense. But the genius of spirited eloquence, and of our orator in particular, fully warrants us to regard it only as a lively figure, and to understand no more by giving up than affording a favorable opportunity of gaining.

*(9) The year before, Cersobleptes, unable to defend this country against Philip, had put the Athenians in possession of it. Cardia, one of the chief cities, refused to acknowledge these new sovereigns, and had recourse to the protection of Philip, who, under pretence of supporting them, carried his arms into Chersonesus.

*(10) Philip had already committed some acts of hostility against this state, but had not as yet formed the siege of Olynthus, or taken any measures tending to it; for in such a case Demosthenes would not have touched so lightly on an enterprise which he afterward dwells on so often and with so much force.

*(11) M. Turreil translates this passage thus: "et qu'il risque de retrouver en vous ces memes Atheniens qu'il rencontra sur son chemin en Eubee" (for which there is no warrant in the original); and taking for granted that all the expeditions here mentioned were made against Philip, he endeavors to settle the date of this to Euboea by conjecture. But it does not appear from history that Philip carried his arms into the island before his attempt on Thermopylae. In the three succeeding Olynthiac orations there is not the least mention of such a thing, though there is a particular recital of his expeditions in the third, and though afterward the orator inveighs loudly against his hostile attempts in Euboea. I apprehend, therefore, that the expedition hinted at in this place was that which the Athenians made about seven years before in favor of the Euboeans against Thebes; when in five days they brought an army in Euboea, and in thirty obliged the Thebans to come to terms, and evacuate the

island (according to Aeschines). Demosthenes mentions this in other places; particularly about the end of the oration on the state of the Chersonesus, where he quotes part of the speech made by Timotheus to encourage the Athenians to this expedition. In the above note I have endeavored to suggest some reasons why the expeditions here alluded to could not have been made against Philip. But it has been affirmed, that if this were so it would be almost impertinent in our orator to mention them; that, as facts, they must be found spiritless, if taken in a general sense; and, as arguments, inconclusive. The translator can with sincerity declare, that if any representation of his tends in the least to depreciate the value of the great original, he readily gives it up as utterly erroneous and indefensible. But at the same time, he must observe, that if it be a fault to make use of such facts and such arguments, it is a fault which Demosthenes has frequently committed. Thus he speaks of the vigorous opposition of his countrymen to the Lacedaemonians; of their marching against the Corinthians and Megareans; of their expelling the Thebans from Euboea. In the second Philippic oration he tells his countrymen that the Macedonian must regard them as the great and strenuous defenders of Greece; because he must be informed of the spirit which their ancestors discovered in the days of his predecessor Alexander. If we are not to allow the orator to reason from the conduct of his contemporaries, on former occasions, to the conduct which they ought to pursue, or which may be expected from them in their contest with Philip, what shall we say of an argument deduced from their ancestors in the heroic age of Athens? The truth seems to be, that although the facts supposed to be alluded to in this passage had been passed over by historians, yet we are not from hence to conclude that they had no weight or importance in the Athenian assembly. We are not to judge of the light in which they appeared there from the obscurity into which distance of time and place may have now cast them. The reasons of this are obvious.

*(12) Tourreil refers this to some action which he supposes might have happened in Boeotia in the course of the Phocian war, and in which the Athenians might have had their share of the honor. But from the text it should seem that the event alluded to must have happened at some considerable distance of time, and have descended to the orator by tradition. About forty years before this oration, when Thebes and Sparta began to quarrel, Lysander, the Spartan general, threatened the Thebans with a very dangerous war, and began with laying siege to this city of Haliartus. The Thebans applied for aid to the Athenians, which they readily granted (though the Thebans had just before pressed for the utter demolition of their state), and obliged Pausanias to raise the siege, after Lysander had been killed. I apprehend that this is the expedition here alluded to. It was the more remarkable, as the Athenian power was then at the lowest ebb. "You, Athenians!" says Demosthenes in his oration on the Crown, "at a time when the Lacedaemonians had the absolute command both at sea and land; when Attica was quite encompassed with their

commanders and their garrisons; when Euboea, Tanagra, all Boeotia, Megara, Aegina, Cleone, and the other islands were in their possession; when the state had not one ship, not one wall, ye marched out to Haliartus."

*(13) He glances particularly at Aristodemus and Neoptolemus. As to Aeschines, he had not been with Philip till six years after.

*(14) In the Greek it is *epistolimaious dunameis*. Instead of enumerating the various senses in which the commentators interpret this expression, I shall copy an observation on it by the Abbe D'Olivet, whose interpretation I have followed: "I have without any refinement chosen a plain expression, which seems to hit the thought of Demosthenes directly, and to paint strongly the bitter ridicule of the passage." It was usual for the Athenians, on any emergency, to write to all quarters to demand soldiers. They were answered, that in such a place such a number would be provided: from another place so many more might be expected. But in the end it appeared that these were by no means so many effective men. There were great abatements to be made from the numbers promised; and we find besides, from this oration, that the foreigners were not paid at all, or ill paid; so that these grand armies were nowhere complete but in the letters written to demand them on one part and to promise them on the other. If I am not mistaken, this is what Demosthenes calls *dunameis epistolimaious*- armies which exist only in letters.

*(15) In consequence of his engagements with the Thessalians, he commanded their ports and ships.

*(16) This was in the same war which he alludes to in the beginning of the oration. Corinth was appointed as the place of general rendezvous for the Greeks who confederated against Sparta.

*(17) Instead of Polystratus, which is a name little known in history, Monsieur Turreil proposes to read Callistratus, who, according to Xenophon and Diodorus, was colleague to Iphicrates and Chabrias in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mounteney has observed, Polystratus is again mentioned by Demosthenes, together with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities; so that it is probable this is the true reading.

*(18) He here alludes to an affair which had happened some time before, and had occasioned great commotion. The Athenians had sent Chares at the head of a powerful force to reduce Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this general, when he had a prospect of success in that enterprise, suffered himself to be corrupted by Artabazus, a rebellious satrap of Asia, and assisted him against an army of seventy thousand men. Chares received a reward proportioned to the service; but this action raised the indignation of the Athenians, as he had not only deserted the cause of the republic, but also incensed the King of Persia. Demosthenes, however, here shifts the blame from Chares to his soldiers, who refused to obey him, or rather to the people, who took no care to provide for their pay.

*(19) So the orator affects to speak; though I apprehend it does not

appear from history that they were at that time directly at war with him. They had, indeed, joined with the Phocians, and Philip was at the head of the opposite confederacy. Thus far they were engaged against each other, though neither of them as principals in the quarrel. The Athenians, indeed, might have made some attempts to recover Amphipolis; they certainly made some ineffectual preparations to relieve Potidaea and Methone; and after Philip's attempt on Thermopylae, did station some forces on their frontiers to oppose him in case he renewed his attack. But still the war was not declared in form. But of this I shall speak more hereafter.

*(20) In the text they were mentioned particularly. Ten taxiarchs (strategoi, or generals) and phylarchs, and two hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes chose a new general every year, and each of these (originally, when all went to the field) had the command for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleasant on this number of commanders. "I never," said he, "could find but one general," meaning Parmenio; "but the Athenians can get ten every year." Anciently, the people on extraordinary occasions chose a polemarch, to determine when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The taxiarch commanded the infantry, the phylarch the cavalry of his tribe. The whole body of horse was divided into two corps, each of which was commanded by a general of horse, or hipparch.

*(21) When in the Social War the revolters invaded it with a fleet of a hundred sail.

*(22) Monsieur Turreil says that this Menelaus was the brother of Philip by another marriage. But though Philip and his brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians would have trusted on so nearly allied to their enemy.

*(23) The regular method of choosing all officers. However, the choice was sometimes left to the commander-in-chief.

*(24) It is not impossible but that the people might have been struck with the freedom and candor of the orator, and given some marks of their approbation.

*(25) The Attic talent is computed by Turreil equal to L187 10s.; by Prideaux, to L188 6s.; by Arbuthnot, to L193 15s. It contained sixty minae, and each mina one hundred drachmae. By the computation of the orator, it appears that the provisions he recommends to be supplied were to last one year.

*(26) Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us the rest of this oration as a sixth Philippic, pronounced in the archonship of Themistocles. But it appears to me, as well as to the other interpreters, a natural conclusion of the first Philippic; and therefore I could not prevail on myself to separate them. The scholiast is of the same opinion, and flatly accuses Dionysius of a mistake. Mr. Mounteney has expressed greater deference for this critic. He supposes that this second part is not that which Dionysius quotes, but that there was another oration, since lost, which began with the same words; for he observes, that the former part is plainly imperfect of itself, and the two parts are joined in all the copies and manuscripts, and that

naturally and consistently, I must confess, with all submission to these authorities, that although I could not presume to separate them, yet I am not quite satisfied that these two parts are one oration. In the first place, I cannot think that the first Philippic would end abruptly if this second part was away; for we find in the first part all that the orator proposes to speak to in the beginning; and it concludes, not unlike a speech in Parliament, with a motion in form, for such and such subsidies to be raised for the maintenance of such and such forces. And as to the manner in which the second part begins, supposing it a distinct oration, we cannot object to that, as Dionysius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the same manner. It might also be observed, that in the beginning of the oration, having for some time exhorted the Athenians to change their conduct and act with vigor. Demosthenes says expressly that he intends to speak no more on that subject, and yet this second part is entirely taken up with it; and lastly, there are some passages in the second part which, I suspect, do not agree to the particular time when the first oration against Philip was pronounced. If this second part be really a distinct oration, spoken after the destruction of Olynthus (for this city was taken the year before the archonship of Themistocles), how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it? It had just then thrown the Athenians into the greatest consternation; and as it was the orator's business to encourage them, possibly he might have kept it out of view on purpose; though, perhaps, he does hint at it obscurely, and as far as was consistent with prudence, as I shall observe by and by.

*(27) In the Greek it is a an umin areske cheirotoneate, chose those things which may be agreeable to you. I own I do not see how their entering into the resolution they liked best would of consequence enable them to oppose Philip effectually. Perhaps it might be of disservice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them against following the bent of their inclinations. If we should make a very small alteration in the text, and for areske read arkese, those things which may be sufficient for your purposes, I apprehend the sense would be better and more agreeable to Demosthenes. I have taken the liberty to translate after this reading.

*(28) Winds which blew regularly every year at the rising of the dogstar, when the Greeks were obliged to retire from action on account of the excessive heats, and which, as they blew from the north, of consequence opposed any attempt of invading Macedon, or sending any forces to those parts which were the seat of Philip's wars at first.

*(29) If this be really a part of the first Philippic, these hostilities must have preceded the attempt on Thermopylae, else the orator could not have distinguished them into those which happened some time ago, and that committed lately. Now, I cannot tell how to reconcile such open acts of hostility with the other parts of Philip's conduct at that time. There was a peace subsisting between him and the Athenians which he affected to observe; and so far does he appear from making any open and professed attack on them, that in the taking of

Potidaea and Pydna he would not act as principal, but as ally to the Olynthians, and, when these cities were taken, dismissed the Athenian garrisons with all imaginable respect and honor; and on all occasions courted and cajoled the Athenians. This, then, is one of those passages which I suspect do not agree to the particular time when the first Philippic was spoken. But if we suppose that this, which I call the second part, is really the oration which Dionysius quotes, and which was spoken to engage the Athenians to defend the islanders and the cities of the Hellespont against the attempts of Philip, then all the difficulty vanishes. The hostilities here mentioned agree very well to a time of open war. Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus was taken that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and we find, that immediately on this, he attacked them and their tributary states with such fury that they were soon glad to sue for peace.

*(30) There were two of these appropriated to religious ceremonies, and all extraordinary emergencies and occasions of the state- the Paralian and the Salaminian. Harpocration understands here the Paralian.

*(31) For the Panathenaea and Dionysia (as these festivals are called in the original) I refer the reader to Potter, and other writers on the antiquities of Greece.

*(32) In the original it is who is the choregus, that is, the citizen who provided the music, of which each tribe had a band; and the gymnasiarch, he who presided over the wrestlers, and provided what was necessary for that entertainment.

*(33) The rich citizens who were obliged, not only to command, but to equip a vessel of war at their own expense, either severally or jointly, for the service of the public. As this was an office of great expense, it was allowed to anyone who was nominated to point out some citizen richer than himself, and to desire he might be substituted in his place, provided he was willing to exchange fortunes with that citizen, and then to take on him the office of trierarch. This is what Demosthenes calls allowing the exchange, which in its nature must have occasioned confusion and delay.

*(34) *Metochoi*, which is translated strangers, were those foreigners who were permitted to sojourn at Athens on certain conditions. This whole passage is an exact description of the proceedings of the Athenians in defence of Olynthus, and of the event. I had it in view when I observed that possibly we might find some obscure allusions to that affair.

*(35) This letter has not descended to us. It is probable, from the context, that he expressed in it a contempt for the Athenian power, and insisted how little dependence the Euboeans could have on that state. And if this be so, it confirms an observation which I made before (see a preceding note), viz. that the Athenians had as yet given Philip no remarkable opposition in Euboea. The letter must have been written when Philip began to raise commotions in that island in order to make himself master of it. I am induced to think, both

from history and Demosthenes, that he did not make any attempts of this kind so early as the first Philippic, and, therefore, that this is no part of that oration.

*(36) They could then command three hundred ships of war, and those capable of engaging a navy of double that number. They had twenty thousand foot and two thousand eight hundred horse; and their revenue amounted to above twelve hundred talents.

*(37) The learned reader will find a beautiful passage in Aulus Gellius (l. iii. c. 27), where, on the contrary, a man of true prudence who engages in the business and dangers of the world is compared to a skilful boxer who is ever attentive to defend himself and annoy his adversary.

*(38) This is the reading which Mr. Mounteney adopts- Peri ton pragmaton etc., instead of chrematon.

*(39) The taking of Pydna, and Potidaea, and Amphipolis may warrant what the orator here says. Yet I should choose to apply it to their suffering Olynthus by their misconduct to fall under the power of Philip.

*(40) I shall trouble the reader but with one argument more in favor of my suspicion that this is no part of the first Philippic. The passage I now quote I cannot think it applicable to the transactions of the Athenians and Philip before his attempt on Thermopylae, when, from the time of Argeus's death, they acted against each other only indirectly; and, instead of punishing Philip, the Athenians could not even prevail on themselves to defend those dominions which they claimed as their own. But it is a very exact description of what happened after their declaration of war against Philip, which succeeded the taking of Olynthus; for this declaration was made from a sense of the danger of Philip's growing power, a resentment of his infractions, and a resolution to reduce him; and yet they were quickly obliged to defend themselves against farther attempts.

*(41) Wherever the Lacedaemonians had power they were always for establishing oligarchies.

*(42) So the King of Persia was called. The intent of this embassy was supposed to be to make such demands as must produce a war with the Persian, which Isocrates had exhorted him to very early.

*(43) Possibly, these rumors were spread by Philip's friends, to persuade the Athenians that his views and schemes were removed to a great distance from Athens.

THE END OF THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

